CAG – Constitutional Auditor Gagged

CAG – Constitutional Auditor Gagged:

By Saumya Ramakrishnan

A day in the life of an Indian citizen is incomplete without the intake of the staple news about the innumerable scams that seem to have become the hallmark of modern democracy. Whether it is the morning newspaper or prime time news, the disclosure of yet another scam and the downfall of a person in power have dominated the news space.

On one hand, such revelations are making the citizens proactive, demanding more accountability and transparency from the Government; on the other, it is making those in power uneasy and defensive. It is not that such misuse of power, disproportionate assets and quid pro quo have been unknown hitherto; however, the frequency with which scam after scam has been coming out of the Pandora’s box suggest that a machinery has been working diligently to expose these undoings.

Close in the line of judicial activism that has held the country in good stead, the “Supreme Audit Institution of India”, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) has been at the forefront of the latest fad – ‘audit activism’. It is the highest institution for enforcing the financial accountability of the Central and State governments, other public authorities, institutions receiving substantial funds from the government, and so on. Wherever public funds are involved, the CAG has a role to play.

A look at some of the biggest scams of the last three decades – Bofors, 2G spectrum, Krishna-Godavari basin, Commonwealth Games – reveals that the report of the CAG has added fuel to the fire or in many cases, been the cause of the fire itself. The politicians fear these reports, while citizen activists look forward to the reports to give them the impetus and documentary backing to bring the government to book. The present CAG of India, Vinod Rai, has taken the reports of the office to the living room of the citizens. One group of citizens has hailed the work of the CAG in exposing the corruption and weak governance in the country, while the affected parties (read: ministers in the spotlight) are going around town claiming that the CAG has overstepped its mandate. It is their argument that the role of the CAG is to merely assess if a policy has been executed in the most optimal manner, and not whether the policy itself is equitable and just in the first place. To understand the thin difference between the two, it is necessary to look at the duties allotted to the CAG by the Constitution and the various other legislations that regulate his functions and role.

Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, while explaining the role of CAG in the Constituent Assembly, said, “The CAG shall be the most important officer under the Constitution of India. For he is to be the guardian of the public purse and it is his duty to see that not a farthing is spent out of the Consolidated Fund of India or of a State without the authority of the appropriate Legislature.”


The duties and powers of the CAG, described in Article 149 of the Constitution, provides that the CAG shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States and of any other authority or body as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament. Article 150 provides that the accounts of the Union and States shall be kept in such form as the President may, on the advice of the CAG, prescribe. The reports of the CAG are taken into consideration by the Public Accounts Committee and the CAG is also the head of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department.
Pursuant to this, the CAG’s Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service Act (DPC Act) was passed in 1971. The DPC Act lays down the service conditions to secure the autonomous nature of the CAG. It confers wide powers on the CAG to audit all receipts and expenditure of the Government of India and the state governments, including those of bodies and authorities substantially financed by the government. The CAG, in the performance of his duties, has the power to put such questions or make such observations as he may consider necessary, to the person in charge of the office and to call for such information as he may require for the preparation of any account or report which it is his duty to prepare. It is this vigilance by the CAG of India in 1985, T.N. Chaturvedi, that led to the disclosure of the Bihar Fodder scam. Noticing the delayed monthly account submissions and incomplete accounts by the Bihar state treasury and departments, the then CAG wrote to the Chief Minister of Bihar warning him that such delays could be indicative of criminal misappropriation of the exchequer’s money, defalcations and frauds. Without such accounts, it was not possible for the CAG to find out how much money was being spent by the government for purchasing fodder. This enabled the government to spend money in excess of what was authorized, thus blinding the authorities. However, it was only seven years after the report was submitted that action was initiated against all those involved, leading right up to the office of the then Chief Minister of Bihar, Lalu Prasad Yadav.
Further, the DPC Act also confers on him the duty to audit all receipts payable into the Consolidated Fund of India and of each state and each union territory having a Legislative Assembly and to satisfy himself that the rules and procedures in that behalf are designed to secure an effective check on the assessment, collection and proper allocation of revenue and are being duly observed and to make for this purpose such examination of the accounts as he thinks fit and report thereon. This provision could be interpreted to conclude that it is well within the mandate of the CAG to satisfy himself that the rules and procedures are designed to attain proper receipts, that is to say, inquire into whether the policy decision is appropriate in order to ensure maximum receipt into the Consolidated Fund.

Additionally, he also ensures that the policy so made is being executed in the most effective manner. The CAG’s report on the allocation of coal blocks by the government (which has not yet been placed before the Parliament, but was leaked out to the media) concluded that the government did not follow a transparent policy in selecting the beneficiaries as they ignored the 2004 recommendation of the secretary in the coal ministry that the mines should be awarded through competitive bidding. The impact was that the companies to whom the blocks were allotted made a gain of Rs.186,000 crore, which is also the amount the exchequer would have gained had the policy been different. Here, the critics of the CAG may state that his mandate is only to check if the policy has been implemented effectively, and not to suggest to the government that bidding would have been a more effective policy. The other side of the coin suggests that as the guardian of the public purse, he has every right to point out that there would have been more receipt into the Consolidated Fund if the policy was different.

With respect to the expenditure out of the Consolidated Fund, the DPC Act provides that “it shall be the duty of CAG to audit all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India and of each state...and to ascertain whether the monies shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available and applicable to the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged and whether the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it.” Thus, if the audit points out that wasteful expenditure or expenditure beyond the budgetary sanction is being made by the government, the CAG is entitled to bring it out, as was seen in the case of the Bihar Fodder scam, where thousands of crores were spent buying fodder, exceeding the budget allotted for the same.

While the DPC Act outlines the functions of the CAG, the Regulations on Audits and Accounts which were issued in 2007 define in detail the scope, manner, and extent of his auditing and accounting mandate. The broad objectives of audit are to ensure legality, regularity, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of financial management and public administration through financial audit (whether financial statements are filed appropriately), compliance audit (whether the provisions of the Constitution, applicable legislations and rules are being complied with) and performance audit (the extent to which an activity, programme or organization operates economically, efficiently and effectively). Again, it can be interpreted that performance audit would invariably raise questions as to whether the policy adopted by the government in allotting land or spectrum or any other scarce resource would result in maximum receipts into the Consolidated Fund.

However, there are many in the political circles who believe that commenting on policy decisions is not the job of the CAG and that a “performance” audit does not include a “propriety” audit. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in the wake of the CAG report on the 2G scam, commented during an interaction with editors in June 2011 that, “It has never been in the past that the CAG has held a press conference as the present one has done. Never in the past has the CAG decided to comment on a policy issue. It should limit the office to the role defined in the Constitution.” More recently, even private sector companies like Reliance Industries Ltd, which is under fire after a CAG report on Krishna-Godavari basin,, have claimed that a performance audit is beyond the scope of the CAG. The reasoning behind this is that policy is the prerogative of the executive, which can be challenged in a court of law or may be debated in the Parliament. It is argued that by law, this is not the role envisaged for the CAG. Every institution, be it the executive, judiciary or legislature, has set for itself, both by law and practice, certain defined roles, which no other party should transgress upon, as it is important that each institution is able to perform its duties independently.

Mr. Vinod Rai, on the other hand, has maintained that the supreme auditing body has the mandate to ensure that government policies are optimally implemented. As regards the debate of commenting on policy and checking its implementation, he has said, “there is a very thin dividing line, where we do at times assess the optimality or sub-optimality of a particular policy in the course of its devolution,” at a book launch event in New Delhi in April 2012.

Also, the CAG, before entering office, takes an oath similar to that of the Chief Justice of India, vowing to “uphold the Constitution and laws” whereas a minister only affirms that he will act in accordance with the Constitution. Thus, if it is the duty of the CAG to uphold the Constitution, does he not have the right to bring it to the notice of the public if any policy is prima facie unconstitutional or confers benefits of the policy or the public purse to a set influential group of people on no strong footing? Also, Ambedkar referred to the CAG as being more important that even the judiciary, as being the guardian of the public purse. Thus, if the receipts into the Consolidated Fund are substantially reduced by reason of a flawed policy as was pointed out in the 2G scam report – underselling scarce resources – it should be within the powers of the CAG as the instrument of accountability to point it out.

The other argument is that in a country which does not boast of an independent prosecuting agency, the CAG acts as the trigger for initiating action, the government being the only authority that can take action, which is itself the faulting party in a lot of these reports. Many believe that the CAG, acting as the accuser, is filling the vacuum of the social auditor which legislations have missed out on, as there is no other body having similar autonomy and powers that can investigate the accounts of the government with such depth.

There’s no denying that the ambiguity with respect to the constitutional role of the CAG has made the office of the CAG into what the person holding it makes out of it, which may not be the best solution in the long term. With a view to removing the ambiguity and giving more teeth to the office of the CAG, three major amendments were proposed to the current government to the DPC Act, 1971. The first amendment seeks to put a cap on the time within which the government must respond to audit queries. The second seeks to ensure that audit reports are tabled in the legislature immediately after their submission by the CAG. And third seeks to clarify its power to audit new forms of government economic activity that have emerged over the years.

Article 38(1) of the Constitution imposes a duty on the State to promote the welfare of the people, which is possible only when there is transparency and accountability in governance. For this, a thorough legal review of the specific role and powers of the CAG and if needed, confer more powers on them to meet the challenges of governance in the 21st century democracy.

The author Saumya Ramakrishnan obtained her Bachelors in Mass Media with a specialization in Journalism from Jai Hind College, Mumbai. In August 2009, she was selected for an exchange program in International Journalism from Carelton University in Canada. She is currently pursuing her LLB from Government Law College, Mumbai.

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Non Compete Clauses and The Indian Contract Act, 1972

Non Compete Clauses and The Indian Contract Act, 1972

A non-compete clause or a covenant not to compete is a term used in contracts under which the employee agrees to not pursue a similar profession, trade or business in competition against the employer. Apart from the regular employment agreements, such covenants are also at times included in the agreements relating to sale of goodwill of business or professional practice, employment exit and other exclusive dealings and service arrangements.

The Indian Contract Act, 1872, which provides a framework of rules and regulations, governing the formation and performance of a contract in India deals with the legality of such non-compete covenants. It stipulates that an agreement, which restrains anyone from carrying on a lawful profession, trade or business, is void to that extent. Under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 agreements in restraint of trade are void.

Agreement in restraint of trade is defined as the one in which a party agrees with any other party to restrict his liberty in the present or the future to carry on a specified trade or profession with other persons not parties to the contract without the express permission of the latter party in such a manner as he chooses. Providing for restraint on employment in the employment contracts of the employees in the form of confidentiality requirement or in the form of restraint on employment with competitors has become a part of the corporate culture.

Section 27
Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession or trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void.
Exception: One who sells goodwill of a business with a buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of business.

Although the section states that all agreements in restraint of any profession, trade or business are void, the current trend as per various judicial pronouncements leads to the conclusion that reasonable restraint is permitted and does not render the contract void ab initio. Reasonableness of restraint depends upon various factors, and the restraint in order to prevent divulgence of trade secrets or business connections has to be reasonable in the interest of the parties to ensure adequate protection to the covenantee. The above section implies that to be valid an agreement in restraint of trade must be reasonable as between the parties and consistent with the interest of the public.

Therefore two terms need to be defined:
1. What is public policy?
2. What is “reasonable”?

PUBLIC POLICY

The concept of public policy is illusive, varying and uncertain. The term ‘Public Policy ’ is not capable of a precise definition and whatever tends to injustice of operation, restraint of liberty, commerce and natural or legal rights; whatever tends to the obstruction of justice or violation of statutes and whatever is against good morals can be said to be against public policy.

It has been held that the concept of public policy is capable of expansion and modification.[1]

The Supreme Court observed in in Gherulal Pathak v. Mahadeodas Maiya[2]
“Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error and when applied to decision of legal rights it is capable of being understood in different senses. It is the province of the judge to expound this law only. They have become a part of recognized law, and we are therefore bound by them. There are several decisions of the courts which lays down a general rule as to what is an agreement opposed to public policy and what is not. These, though provide guidelines as to defining ‘public policy’ cannot be used as a sure shot rule”.

Agreements opposed to public policy:
There are several moral, legal, ethical constraints. Some case laws help to understand what an agreement in restraint of public policy is.
If an agreement is such that it tends to injure public interest or public welfare it is against public policy [3]
Where there is an agreement between the parties that a certain consideration should proceed from the accused person to the complainant in return for the promise of the complainant to discontinue the criminal proceedings is clearly a transaction as opposed to public policy[4]

Agreements Not Opposed to Public Policy:
A contract for manning, running, operating, repairing and maintenance on hire for three vehicles was entered into between parties. The contracts inter alia provided that the employer shall have the right to terminate the contract after expiry of one year without assigning reasons. It was held that such a stipulation was not unconscionable or opposed to public policy[5]

Hence using these guidelines courts can deduce what is public policy as it has not been appropriately defined in any case law.

WHAT IS REASONABLE?

As defined by the dictionary reasonable means – according to reason.
Hence whatever a reasonable man would do, using commonsense and knowledge, under the given circumstances, will account as reasonable. Therefore the test of reasonability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

 Where services are performed under an agreement that the remuneration shall be to the discretion of the employer, the question whether the employer has the right to determine whether any remuneration at all shall be paid, so that his decision is a condition precedent to any claim or merely has the right to fix the amount of the remuneration, is a question of construction and intention in each particular case.[6]

Reasonable restrictions can be placed in the following ways:

1. Distance: suitable restrictions can be placed on employee to not practice the same profession within a stipulated distance, the stipulation being reasonable.

2. Time limit: if there is a reasonable time provided in the clause then it will fall under reasonable restrictions.

3. Trade secrets: the employer can put reasonable restrictions on the letting out of trade secrets.

4. Goodwill: There is an exception under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act on the distribution of goodwill.

NON COMPETE CLAUSES UNENFORCEABLE IN INDIA

With the increase in cross-border trade and an enhanced competitive climate in India, confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicitation agreements are becoming increasingly popular, especially in the IT and technology sectors. An increasing number of outsourcing and IT companies are including confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicitation clauses in agreements with their employees, with terms ranging from a few months to several years after the employment relationship are terminated. The companies claim that such restrictions are necessary to protect their proprietary rights and their confidential information.

Indian courts have consistently refused to enforce post-termination non-compete clauses in employment contracts, viewing them as "restraint of trade" impermissible under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and as void and against public policy because of their potential to deprive an individual of his or her fundamental right to earn a livelihood.

There are various case laws that will clear out the situation in India:

Supreme Court of India in Percept D' Mark (India) Pvt. Ltd v Zaheer Khan [7] observed that under Section 27 of the Act a restrictive covenant extending beyond the term of the contract is void and not enforceable. The court also noted that the doctrine of "restraint of trade" is not confined to contracts of employment only, but is also applicable to all other contracts with respect to obligations after the contractual relationship is terminated.

In a 2009 decision by the New Delhi High Court in Desiccant Rotors International Pvt Ltd v Bappaditya Sarkar & Anr [8] involved a senior marketing manager at a manufacturer of evaporative cooling components, products and systems. As part of his employment agreement with Desiccant, the manager agreed that for two years following the termination of his employment, he would be bound by a covenant with Desiccant that would require him to keep Desiccant's matters confidential, and that would prevent him from competing with Desiccant and soliciting Desiccant's customers, suppliers and employees. Expressly embodied in the employment agreement was an acknowledgment by the manager that he was dealing with confidential material of Desiccant, including: know-how, technology trade secrets, methods and processes, market sales, and lists of customers. After a few years of employment, the manager resigned and-notwithstanding the terms of his old employment agreement-within three months of his resignation joined a direct competitor of Desiccant as country manager in charge of marketing and started contacting customers and suppliers of Desiccant. In injunctive proceedings against the manager by Desiccant, the High Court reiterated the principles embodied in Section 27 of the Act and the individual's fundamental right to earn a living by practicing any trade or profession of his or her choice. Brushing aside any argument by Desiccant that the restrictive covenants were primarily designed to protect its confidential and proprietary information, the High Court ruled that in the clash between the attempt of employers to protect themselves from competition and the right of employees to seek employment wherever they choose, the right of livelihood of employees must prevail. However the High Court did allow an injunction against the manager prohibiting him from soliciting Desiccant's customers and suppliers to stand in effect.

Similarly, in a 2007 decision in V.F.S. Global Services Ltd. v. Mr. Suprit Roy [9]

The Bombay High Court held that a fully paid three-month "garden leave" agreement with a senior manager did not renew the employment contract and constituted a "restraint of trade" unenforceable by V.F.S. However, relief for breach of non-solicitation obligations was denied on the basis of vagueness of the relief claimed.

In Superintendence Company of India vs Krishan Murgai [10]

The Supreme Court held that a contract, which had for its object a restraint of trade, was prima facie void. The company, with its head office at Kolkata and branch office at New Delhi, carried on business as valuers and surveyors. It had established a reputation and goodwill in its business by developing its own techniques for quality testing and control and possessed trade secrets in the form of these techniques and clientele. Mr Murgai was employed as branch manager of the New Delhi office. One of clauses of the terms and conditions of employment placed him under a post-service restraint that he would neither serve any other competitive firm nor carry on business on his own in similar line for two years at the place of his last posting; and the restriction would come into operation after he left the company. When he was terminated from service, the employee started a business on similar lines. When the matter came for appeal, the Supreme Court held that under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service was void.

In Star India Pvt Ltd. V. Laxmiraj Seetharam Nayak [11],

The Bombay High Court held that an employer has right to terminate the contract of employment on the ground of misconduct; hence, it cannot be said that the employee had absolutely no right to resign from the employment on account of better prospects or other personal reasons. It was observed by the court that merely because for some time the employer might face some inconvenience, the employee concerned cannot be forced to come back for the pleasure of the employer or to satisfy the ego of the higher-ups of the contemplated competition in the market.

In Sandhya Organic Chemicals P.Ltd v. United Phosphorous [12],

The Gujarat High Court held that a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service is void. It was held that an employee could not be restrained for all times to come to use his knowledge and experience which he gained during the course of employment either with the employer or with any other employer. It was also held that the principles laid down by the English Courts on common law and equity will not be applicable in view of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

In Lalbhai Dalpatbhai and co. v. Chittaranjan Chandulal Pandya[13],

The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court consolidated all the fundamental principles concerning the negative stipulation in the contract of service during the service period and after the service period. The Bench dealt with the problem with utmost clarity and great vision. In fact, this should be a guiding judgment on the point. While considering the freedom of contract and the freedom of occupation, they laid down the fundamental principle that the freedom of contract must yield to the freedom of occupation in public interest.” The Bench said that it must be seen whether the enforcement of the negative stipulation is “reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the employer. If it is not going to benefit the employer in any legitimate manner, the court would not injunct the employee from exercising his skill, training and knowledge merely because the employee has agreed to it.”

In M/S Gujarat Pottling Co.Ltd. & Ors vs The Coca Cola Co. & Ors on 4 August, 1995[14]

The Supreme Court exhaustively reviewed the law relating to the validity of the contracts containing a negative covenant in commercial agreements. In paragraph No. 14 of the agreement entered into in the year 1993 between the parties in Gujrat Bottling Company's case provided that the Bottler would not manufacture, bottle, sale deed or otherwise be connected with the products, beverages of any other brands or trademarks/trade names during the subsistence of the agreement including the period of one year notice of termination. The 1993 agreement between the parties in that case was construed by the Supreme Court to be an agreement of a grant of franchiser by Coca Cola as a franchiser to Gujarat Botting Co. (GBC) as a franchisee whereby the GBC had been permitted to manufacture, bottle and sell beverages covered by the trade marks in the area covered by the agreement. The Supreme Court was required to consider whether the negative stipulation contained in paragraph No. 14 of the 1993 agreement being in restraint of trade was void under provisions of section 27 of the Contract Act. The Supreme Court noted that in England in earlier times, all contracts in restraint of relaxed and it became a rule that a partial restraint might be good if reasonable although a general restraint was void. The distinction between the general and partial restraint was subsequently repudiated and the rule, in England, now is that restraints whether general of partial may be good if they are reasonable and any restraint of freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonable to be valid. The principle that agreement in restraint of trade is void is a common law principle applicable in England while it has a statutory recognition under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. While construing the provisions of section 27 of the Contract Act, the High Courts in India have held that neither the test of reasonableness nor the principle that the restraint being partial or reasonable are applicable to a case governed by section 27 of the Contract Act, unless it falls within the exception. The Law Commission in its 13th report has recommended that the provision (section 27 of the Contract Act) should be suitably amended to allow such restrictions and all contracts in restraint of trade, general or partial as were reasonable in the interest of the parties as well as public. No action is, however, been taken by the Parliament on the said recommendations (See paragraph No. 23).

However the court has upheld the non compete principle where is it reasonable:

In the case The Supreme Court of India in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd [15]. observed that restraints or negative covenants in the appointment or contract may be valid if they are reasonable. A restraint upon freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade. The court held that a person may be restrained from carrying on his trade by reason of an agreement voluntarily entered into by him with that object. In such a case the general principle of freedom of trade must be applied with due regard to the principle that public policy requires the utmost freedom to the competent parties to enter into a contract and that it is public policy to allow a trader to dispose of his business and to afford to an employer an unrestricted choice of able assistance and the opportunity to instruct them in his trade and its secrets without fear of their becoming his competitors. Where an agreement is challenged on the ground of its being in restraint of trade, the onus is upon the party supporting the contract to show that the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect his interests. Once, this onus is discharged by him, the onus of showing that the restrain is nevertheless injurious to the public is upon the party attacking the contract.

Hence the non-compete covenants used in agreements can be categorized into in term and post term covenants. In an employment contract, the basic interests of the employer which are required to be protected include trade secrets and business connections and other such confidential information. In case of restraints in contracts of employment the nature of business and employment is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of restraints. An employee owes a duty to the employer to not disclose to others or use to his own advantage the trade secrets or confidential information which he had access to during the course of employment and he could be restrained from or sued for divulging or utilizing any such information in his new employment. But once again, he cannot be prevented from taking up the employment. Also, the employer cannot prevent the use of employee’s knowledge, skill or experience even if the same is acquired during the course of employment. Restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after termination of the contract than in those cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract.

Negative covenants operative during the period of contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve the employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and do not fall under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act,1872. A negative covenant, one that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get employment under any other employer for whom he/she would perform similar or substantially similar duties, is not a restraint of trade unless the contract is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided

CONCLUSION

It is well established by the various case laws decided in the courts of India that ‘non compete’ clauses that extend after the termination of employment are not enforceable in India. It is stated clearly in section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that agreements in restraint of trade are void. In the garb of confidentiality, an employer cannot be allowed to perpetuate forced employment, as it is hit by Section 27.

Even though these clauses are valid in foreign countries, the laws and judicial interpretations of other countries will hardly have any effect on Indian courts if the statutory laws of this country are unambiguous. Post term restrictive covenants have been held invalid through various judicial pronouncements. An employer is not entitled to protect himself against competition on the part of an employee after the employment has ceased. However, a purchaser of a business is entitled to protect himself against competition per se on the part of the vendor and it has been upheld that a employer has no legitimate interest in preventing an employee after he/she leaves his service from entering the service of a competitor merely on the grounds that the employee has started working with a competitor, unless the same leads to misuse or an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, which has been provided to the employee during his course of employment

Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the live to livelihood and since it is a fundamental right it is held to be inviolable. This makes the enforcing of non compete clauses in India even more of a difficult task.

[1]P.Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1844 (1994) 3 SCC 394
[2]AIR 1959 SC 781: 1959 Supp(2)SCR 406
[3]RattanChand Hira Chand v. Aksar Nawaz Jung , (1991) 3 SCC 67
[4]Ouseph Poulo v. Catholic Union Bank ltd AIR 1965 SC 166: (1964) 7 SCR 745
[5]Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. V. Streamline Shipping Co., AIR 2002 Bom 420 (DB)
[6]S.Ranjan v. Indian Union AIR 1966 Mad 235: 78 Mad LW 636 (DB)
[7]AIR 2006 SC 3426
[8]I.A. No.5455/2008, I.A. No.5454/2008 & I.A. No.5453/2008 in CS(OS) No.337/2008
[9]2008(2)Bom CR 446, 2007(2) CTLJ 423 Bom
[10]1980 AIR 1717, 1980 SCR(3)1278
[11]2003(3) Bom CR 563, 2003(3)MhLj 726
[12]AIR 1997 Guj 177
[13]AIR 1966 Guj 189, (1966) GLR 493
[14]1995 AIR 2372, 1995 SCC (5) 545
[15]1967 AIR 1098, 1967 SCR (2)378

Article By : Apurva Thakur
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Non-Compete-Clauses-and-The-Indian-Contract-Act-1972-4621.asp#.UBLUc7TKmLQ

Right to kill: US is paying for its liberal gun law - Analysis - DNA

Right to kill: US is paying for its liberal gun law - Analysis - DNA:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed
— US Constitution: Second Amendment (Bill of Rights)

The recent tragedy in Colorado, where a madcap PhD student opened unprovoked fire at a crowd of movie-watchers in Aurora, killing 12, has shocked the nation. (The last such ghastly incident was in April 2007 at the Virginia Tech state university when a mentally unstable student of South Korean origin went on a rampage, killing 32 people) The incident has reopened the traditional debate on the perils of a liberal gun law.

The US is notorious for having a string of generous legislations that facilitate easy buying of firearms by anyone, even one who has a psychological illness. The Second Amendment, which incorporates the Bill of Rights, guarantees citizens the right to possess firearms. All courts, including the US Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that the right is not merely of the State, but of the individual citizen as well, dispelling all doubts about whether the Founding Fathers had only public authorities in mind while referring to a ‘militia’.

They have also uniformly taken the position that there cannot be total abrogation of the right, and that, at best, the executive could impose a few reasonable restrictions, like a background check for a concealed criminal record with a mandatory waiting period for clearance and the state of mental health of the prospective gun buyer. Otherwise, it is as good as a free-for-all, something that intimidates visitors from other countries where there are severe regulations pertaining to buying and owning a firearm.

While the powerful and influential National Rifle Association in the US jealously guards the right of citizens to freely own and carry firearms (concealed in transit and from open public display in normal times) across the country, those who are opposed to this laxity have been carrying on a relentless campaign for more restrictions.

The NRA’s influence can be gauged from the facts that presidential aspirant Mitt Romney has resiled from his earlier stance as governor in favour of heavily restricted gun rights, and President Obama has discreetly evaded the issue, despite his known abhorrence of firearms in private hands.

The general feeling in the US is that the anti-gun lobby is fast losing ground. The factor that weighs heavily against them is the marked drop in overall crime in the country, although murders using firearms remain high at more than 60% of all homicides. The pro-gun lobby says such tragedies are the product of a sick mind rather than one resulting from free availability of guns. They say more guns in the market do not readily mean more crime, a stand that is buttressed by a nationwide downward trend in violent crime (homicides dropped by more than 5% during the first few months of 2011).

This is no doubt a deceptive argument, because it is nobody’s case that every citizen who possesses a gun misuses it. It is the sheer inability of public authorities to identify and take care of the mentally imbalanced and deny them any opportunity to obtain weapons that is the core of the problem.

The Virginia Tech assassin, Seung-Hui Cho, managed to secure two handguns despite having known psychiatric problems. Holmes, the Aurora offender, is said to have possessed three firearms. He has a known history of depression during the past few years when, from a brilliant academic, he turned into a recluse and a drop-out.

To cap it all, he admitted to have booby-trapped his residence, an act that clearly smacks of a badly deranged mind.

Despite the bravado of US policymakers that occurrences like Virginia Tech and Aurora cannot be attributed to loose gun regulation, there is a lurking fear in most American minds that free availability of guns is dangerous to the average peace-loving citizen. When you walk the US streets, you will have to presume that a stalker or anyone who confronts you has a weapon on his person. This is the psyche that persuades many law enforcement personnel to open fire in a jiffy at an individual, however mildly the latter may challenge the former’s authority.

We in India are far better off. The absence of guns explains why there are fewer murders, if one takes into account the fact that we are no less a violent nation than the US. We have nearly as many attempts to murder as there are murders only because the victim invariably escapes with serious injuries caused by weapons other than firearms.

There are no trends as yet that the phenomenon of unlicensed weapons is escalating in our country. A restrictive and honestly-implemented licencing policy has worked well. But for how long, few of us know. The corruption that permeates administration should not be allowed to percolate down to the routine that attends grant of gun licences.

If this is not taken seriously we are in for trouble soon, especially because there is no accurate study on the availability of unlicensed crude guns in some parts of the country, like UP and Bihar.


The writer is a former CBI director

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Money Laundering Through The Criminal's Eyes | Compliancex

Money Laundering Through The Criminal's Eyes | Compliancex:
by Julie DiMauro

There are untold numbers of money laundering schemes involving legitimate businesses. Legal businesses, especially those involved in trade based transactions, have played a much bigger role in the cleaning of illicit funds than most people realize.

Money laundering is a process that begins with “placement,” usually involves layering and often winds up including the integration of funds into the “legitimate” economy. Sophisticated money laundering is carried out typically by a loose-knit group of people with varying resources. It is multifaceted and more complex than an otherwise two-dimensional approach carried out by just one method. It’s not typical that one person or resource can, in any sustained manner, entirely complete the money laundering process without detection. Legitimate businesses may participate with banks (wittingly or unwittingly) to complete a series of transactions to launder illicit funds.
1. The purchase of goods from legitimate businesses inside free trade zones is a common method of laundering large amounts of illicit funds.

It is an extraordinarily popular technique; it not only enables the disposal of illicit cash, but offers a legitimate-appearing source of revenue to organizations when purchased goods are sold. In those zones, representatives of organizations tender large amounts of bulk cash, wire transfers, third-party checks, cashier’s checks, money orders and traveler’s checks to businesses that offer the bulk sales of goods manufactured all over the world.

These forms of payment are accepted readily and labeled “normal” in free trade zones. The major free trade zones operating around the globe are often situated inside haven countries with limited or ineffective transaction reporting. Dubai is a prime example of the type of free zone that is attractive to those with illicit funds. My anti-money laundering (AML) contacts tell me that it is amazing to them that some sources suggest trade-based transactions in Dubai are an emerging money-laundering technique. The truth is that it has been used by crooks to clean dirty money for decades.
2. Another popular money-laundering scheme involves the exploitation of the legitimate export companies operating in many countries, such as Colombia.

Colombian export companies offer a unique opportunity for individuals in South America who own illicit funds abroad and want to repatriate dirty money to their countries. The laundering of funds through export companies based outside the United States can best be illustrated with a hypothetical example.

Let’s say that “export company A” in Colombia sells $150m worth of coffee to Starbucks in the United States every year. At the time of exportation, export company A receives a “document of exportation” documenting that $150m worth of coffee was sent to various U.S. ports on behalf of Starbucks. With that document of exportation, export company A can coordinate with its local bank and the Bank of the Republic in Colombia to take advantage of special high exchange rates given to exporters, thus enabling the $150m to end up in Colombia.

Here’s how it works: The U.S.-based buyer sends wire transfers to a U.S.-based correspondent bank, for credit to the account of the Colombian bank in the United States, and for further credit to their foreign branch in Colombia. In some instances, notation is also made that the wire is intended for further credit to export company A. Within 30 days, those funds are converted to Colombian pesos and credited to the account of export company A in Colombia. What the rest of the world doesn’t know is that export company A left much of their U.S. dollar revenue outside of Colombia, because it had no interest in repatriating all $150m. Some of the money might be kept out of Colombia because of concerns about local inflationary rates, or because some of the $150m was needed for other types of US-dollar transactions carried out by export company A.

Hypothetically, let’s say that $30m of the $150m was not repatriated. What often happens is that trafficking organizations pay export company A an under-the-table fee (usually an amount equal to two percent to five percent of the illicit funds moved) to transfer $30m of narco-dollars from the United States to Colombia, under the guise that it came from the sale of coffee. This process creates a legitimate appearance for the $30m that crossed the borders of the United States to Colombia.
3. Large volumes of manufactured goods in the United States are also purchased with illicit dollars converted to third-party checks, cashier’s checks, money orders and traveler’s checks.

These funds are tendered routinely to US companies with Latin American divisions that market products in Latin America. Poultry, cigarettes, aircraft and even global greeting card companies receive these funds, usually through a lock-box arrangement with their local U.S. bank, and often fail to file the 8300 forms disclosing their receipt of these funds. An AML expert with whom I spoke told me that he has spoken to credit managers around the United States who collect debt from Latin American buyers purchasing container loads of U.S.-produced goods. They have reported to him that hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of payments from Latin American companies are received most often in the form of third-party cashier’s checks, money orders and traveler’s checks in increments under $10,000.

Compliance and AML officers need more support when these types of situations arise. They should be given a means by which – when the circumstances warrant it – they have the time and resources to come to a fair risk assessment and evaluate “the big picture,” and not just the snapshot transaction of the moment. If many compliance officers don’t have that opportunity, they need to escalate the matter up the line to those with the authority to give them this access and ability to maintain an effective an up-to-date AML program.

Julie DiMauro reports on financial services regulatory compliance issues for Thomson Reuters.

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HSBC Allowed Anti-Money Laundering Violations ?? | Compliancex and The Economist

"Pervasively Polluted" Compliance Culture At HSBC Allowed Egregious Anti-Money Laundering Violations | Compliancex:

An extremely disturbing report released by the Senate Monday in advance of a hearing today details a culture of compliance set by HSBC executives in which obvious anti-money laundering risks were ignored in favor of easy profits.

The report accuses HSBC of diverse anti-money laundering violations including failing to terminate ties with terrorist banks in Saudi Arabia, drug cartels in Mexico, and Iranians seeking to avoid U.S. sanctions between 2001 and 2010, according to Dealbook. In fact, HSBC officials are even accused of counseling Iranians on how to avoid the glare of American regulators.

In the Cayman Islands, HSBC held 50,000 client accounts with $2.1 billion but no staff on location, the report said. In Mexico, HSBC continued doing business with Mexican casas de cambio, which U.S. authorities warned were fronts for drug cartel money laundering, years after other banks ceased to conduct transactions with them. Between 2007 and 2008, HSBC allegedly shipped $7 billion between Mexico and the United States. In addition, HSBC evaded U.S. sanctions by “stripping data” from transactions involving Sudan, North Korea, and Iran.

In the Middle East, HSBC maintained relationships with banks that were accused of funding terrorist activities, including Al Qaeda, or being partially owned by terrorist organizations.

Part of HSBC’s “pervasively polluted” compliance culture that allowed these anti-money laundering violations to continue unheeded, the report uncovered, was a tendency to terminate compliance officers who had any problem with the bank’s unsavory business deals. An HSBC anti-money laundering compliance official, on his way out of the bank, described it as having ”a culture [of] pursuing profits and targets at all costs” and said that it “was only a matter of time before the bank faced criminal sanctions,” according to the report as quoted in the Wall Street Journal. Another compliance officer based in Latin America commented, according to the WSJ:


“What is this, the School of Low Expectations Banking?” one HSBC Latin America compliance official wrote in a blistering complaint about the practices at HSBC Mexico, according to the report. The anti-money laundering committee “can’t keep rubber-stamping unacceptable risks because someone on the business side writes a nice letter.…We have seen this movie before, and it ends badly.”

According to the report, HSBC neglected to allocate adequate resources to its compliance department: “Fewer than 200 employees were charged with monitoring and investigating suspicious transactions that set off internal alerts, Senate investigators said, at one time leading to a backlog of 17,000 transactions awaiting review,” said the WSJ. When a compliance officer complained about the lack of resources, he was terminated.

The report also implicates the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for failing to properly oversee the bank.

Though HSBC is expected to apologize during today’s hearing, Sen. Carl Levin, the leader of the investigation, says it is not enough. While the bank is saying all the right things, and that is fine, it has said all the right things before,” he said, warning that the bank failed to remedy its behavior after similar anti-money laundering complaints in the past.

Levin also warned of the dangers of financial regulators that fail to enforce laws. “As long as a bank just sees that it is going to be dealt with kid gloves, I think we are going to continue to see these shortfalls that have been so endemic,” he said.


Beth Connolly is Editor-in-Chief of the Wall Street Job Report and the Compliance Exchange. She blogs creatively at When Nutmeg Met Basil. Connect with her on LinkedIn , Twitter, andAbout.Me.
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Fine and punishment

The economics of crime suggests that corporate fines should be even higher

http://www.economist.com/node/21559315?fsrc=nlw|hig|7-19-2012|2829407|36859804|

IT HAS been a bumper summer for corporate fines and settlements. In the past three months alone firms in Britain and America have agreed to pay out over $10 billion because of wrongdoing. But the economics of crime suggests that fines imposed by regulators may need to rise still further if they are to offset the rewards from lawbreaking.

The latest allegations of bad behaviour are a familiar brew of overcharging, mis-selling and price-fixing. Banks have been the worst offenders. Barclays was fined $450m for its part in a price-fixing scandal; others will follow. HSBC is expected to receive a hefty fine for allegedly flouting money-laundering regulations. Two pharmaceuticals firms, GlaxoSmithKline and Abbott Laboratories, have been stung for illegal marketing.

That some firms behave badly is nothing new, but the response of the authorities has changed recently. Take cartels. Internationally, fines rose by a factor of one thousand between the 1990s and 2000s. Data from America suggest this is not because there are more cartel cases, which have shown no upward trend since the late 1980s. Rather, the average level of fines has risen (see left-hand chart). Recent penalties have smashed records. The Barclays fine includes the largest ever levied by Britain’s financial regulator and America’s Commodity Futures Trading Commission, for instance. Even so, are fines high enough to work?


In an influential 1968 paper* on the economics of crime, Gary Becker of the University of Chicago set out a framework in which criminals weigh up the expected costs and benefits of breaking the law. The expected cost of lawless behaviour is the product of two things: the chance of being caught and the severity of the punishment if caught. This framework can be used to examine the appropriate level of fines, and to see if there are ever reasons to exempt companies from fines.The economics of crime prevention starts with a depressing assumption: executives simply weigh up all their options, including the illegal ones. Given a risk-free opportunity to mis-sell a product, or form a cartel, they will grab it. Most businesspeople are not this calculating, of course, but the assumption of harsh rationality is a useful way to work out how to deter rule-breakers.






In thinking about how to set fines, it helps to start from the extremes. One option is to have no fines at all for corporate wrongdoing, and to rely instead on market forces to impose the costs that keep firms in line. The market-based approach to antitrust regulation, popularised by Aaron Director of the University of Chicago, holds that antitrust violations must be ripping someone off, whether a customer or a supplier. The same is true of mis-selling cases. In time a firm acting in this way will lose business, meaning that crime will not pay.

The problem with this view is that frictions—the costs to customers of switching, say, or the barriers to entry for competitors—can allow exploitative firms to escape punishment. Market constraints alone are not always enough to ensure good behaviour. In a 2007 paper, John Connor and Gustav Helmers of Purdue University examined 283 international cartels that operated between 1990 and 2005. The aggregate revenue increase these cartels achieved by acting as they did was over $300 billion.

At the other extreme is a system of very high fines. Indeed, Mr Becker’s crime calculus might lead to the conclusion that fines should be as draconian as possible—seizing all a wrongdoer’s assets, for example. Anything lower reduces the expected cost of criminality, without doing anything to improve the probability of detection. (Treating whistleblowers leniently is consistent with this logic: letting them off punishment raises the odds of truth-telling, and therefore of detection.) There are plenty of arguments against ultra-high fines, however. One is that false convictions carry too high a cost. Another is that fines of this sort could cripple firms, reducing competition.

A middle way might be for regulators to levy penalties that offset the benefits of crime. Data on cartels supply useful guidance on how to go about calculating these fines. The first step is to measure the expected gain from crime which fines need to offset. In the study by Messrs Connor and Helmers, the median amount that cartel members overcharged was just over 20% of revenue in affected markets. Next, you need an assumption about the chances of being found out: a detection rate of one cartel in three would mean trustbusters were doing well. In this example, that would mean a fine of 60% of revenue is needed to offset an expected benefit of 20% of revenue—far higher than the fines in the study, which were between 1.4% and 4.9%.

The calculus of crime

Assessed against this methodology, even apparently hefty fines look pretty weak. Recent big penalties (see right-hand chart) have been far lower than a crime calculus of this sort would suggest is needed, even allowing for the fact that some firms, like Barclays, get discounts for co-operating with the authorities. Britain looks particularly lenient. Its antitrust laws impose fines of up to 10% of revenues; American regulators levy penalties of up to 40%, and the European Commission goes up to 30%.

Disgruntled customers may later bring private lawsuits, which can further raise the cost of crime. Here crime economics would suggest the American “class action” system, bunching many customers’ complaints into a single lawsuit, is an asset Europe lacks. MasterCard and Visa this month agreed to a $7.3 billion settlement to resolve retailers’ lawsuits alleging collusion (which the two firms deny) over credit-card fees. Criminal charges against individuals can also focus minds. Yet litigation and criminal charges tend to take years to emerge; many wrongdoers are able to avoid court. To deter bad behaviour fines need to rise. The watchdogs are biting, but some need sharper teeth.

Sources

“Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” by Gary S. Becker, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1968), pp. 169-217

“The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis” by Richard A. Posner, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 4 (Apr., 1979), pp. 925-948

“Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005” by John M. Connor and C. Gustav Helmers, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01

Economist.com/blogs/freeexchange

Bar Council of India extends recognition to several law degrees « RLS's Blog

Bar Council of India extends recognition to several law degrees: Good news for Australia; Bad for NZ. « RLS's Blog:

List of Foreign Universities Whose Degrees in law Recognized By the Bar Council of India

As on 18^th May, 2012

Conditions

The Degrees in law from the following Universities abroad enjoy recognition by the Bar Council of India provided:

(i) The students have undergone a regular law course after graduation in the pattern of 10+2+3+3 or a 5 year course in the pattern of 10+2+5

(ii) The following conditions are applicable for Universities which are marked with “*” in the list given under United Kingdom.

·         (a) Three years’ LLB degree only if taken after a three years’ bachelor degree course in any subject (that is after obtaining BA / BSc /BCom /BBA); or

·         (b) Three Years’ LL.B. course followed immediately by 1 year whole time LPC/BVC and followed by a contract of service with a Law Firm for two years to be entitled to be enrolled as a solicitor or take pupilage for a year in a Chamber of a qualified Barrister to be a Master, or

·         (c) Four Years’ of LLB jointly with another subject like Finance, Accounts, Management or a Language to be immediately followed by one year full time LPC/BVC from a College of Inns of courts/ Solicitors Society or a Master degree in Law.

—0—

Sl. No.	Country Name	Name of the University	Resolution Number	Degrees in Law
1.	AUSTRALIA	1.        UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE	Item.No.83/2001(LE) LE Mtg. 5th Oct., 2001.	LL. B. Degree
		2.        NATHAN CAMPUS, GRIFFTH UNIVERSITY, BRISBANE	74/2006	LL. B. three year Degree
		3.        SCHOOL OF LAW, BOND UNIVERSITY, GOLD COST	74/2006	LL. B. three year Degree
		4.        QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, BRISBANE	74/2006	LL. B. three year Degree
		5.        THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH WALES, SYDNEY	74/2006	LL. B. three year Degree
		6.        THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY., CANBERRA	74/2006	LL. B. three year Degree
		7.        UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		8.        UNIVERSITY OF FLINDERS	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		9.        UNIVERSITY OF MONASH	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		10.      UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CROSS	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		11.      UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		12.      UNIVERSITY OF  TASMANIA	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
		13.      UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY	Item No.24/2009 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
2.	BANGLADESH [Erstwhile East Pakistan and now Bangladesh]	1.        RAJASHAHI UNIVERSITY	48/1965	Degree in Law
		2.        DACCA UNIVERSITY	48/1965	Degree in Law
		3.        CHITTAGONG UNIVERSITY	11/1976 (LE)	LL. B. Degree
3.	CANADA	1.        SASKAT CHEWAN UNIVERSITY	82/1982	LL. B. Degree
		2.        UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA	102/1991	LL. B. Degree
		3.        UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, ONTARIO	Item. No. 23/2006(LE)	LL.B. Degree
4.	MYANMAR [Erstwhile Barmah]	1.        RANGOON UNIVERSITY	a.        45/1965 b.        105/1972 c.         79/1973	Degree in Law (prior to 4.1.48) B. L. Degree (taken in 1957) Degree in Law
5.	NEPAL	1.        TRIBHUVAN UNIVERSITY	a.        38/1966 b.        162/1967 c.         26/1976 (LE) d.        5/1978 (LE) e.         Item. No.19/1987 (LE)	Law Degree Law Degree Law Degree Law Degree LL. B. Degree
6.	PAKISTAN	1.        KARACHI UNIVERSITY	46/1971	LL. B. Degree
		2.        PUNJAB UNIVERSITY, LAHORE	76/1966	Degree in Law
		3.        UNIVERSITY OF SIND	100/1969	Degree in Law
7.	POLAND	1.        UNIVERSITY OF STAPHEN BATROI, IRWILUS	17/1974	Master of Law (Magister Juris)
8.	SINGAPORE	1.        UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE	100/1969	Degree in Law
9.	SOUTH KOREA	1.        HANDONG INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOOL, HANDONG GLOBAL UNIVERSITY, POHANG, SOUTH KOREA	Item No. 55/2007(LE)	Master of Law Degree
10.	UGANDA	1.        MAKARERE UNIVERSITY, KAMPALA	18/1974	LL.B. Degree
11.	UNITED KINGDOM	1.        BUCKINGHAM UNIVERSITY	68/1993	LL. B. Degree
		2.        CITY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON	96/1980	Diploma in Law
		3.        COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL ACADEMIC AWARDS	86/1978 & 14/1990	B.A. Degree in Law. & LL.B (Hons.) Degree
		4.        HULL UNIVERSITY	21/1990	LL. B. Degree
		5.        INNS OF COURTS SCHOOL OF LAW	68/1978	Three year law course
		6.        LEEDS UNIVERSITY	41/1972	LL.B. Degree
		7.        LEICESTER UNIVERSITY	Item. No. 56/2001(LE) Le. Mtg. 31st May & 1stJune, 2001	LL.B. Degree
		8.        LONDON UNIVERSITY	a.        4A/1970, 37/1983 b.        15/1990	LL.B. Degree LL.B. Degree (External) Prior to 10th & 11thFebruary, 1990
		9.                    OXFORD UNIVERSITY	116/1969	LL.B. Degree
		10.      CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY	116/1969	B. A. Degree in law
		11.      THAMES VALLEY UNIVERSITY	47/2000	LL.B (Hons.) Degree
		12.      UNIVERSITY OF WALES COLLEGE OF CARDIFF	a.        17/1988 b.        21/1991 (modification of 17/1988)	LL.B. Degree LL.B. Degree
		13.      UNIVERSITY OF BRIMINGHAM	14/1990	LL.B. Degree
		14.      UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER	14/1990	LL.B. Degree
		15.      UNIVERSITY OF HEARTFORDSHIRE	43/2000	LL.B. (Hons.) Degree
		16.      UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM	46/2000	LL.B. Degree
		17.      UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL	19/2011	LL.B. Degree
		18.      UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK	Item No.27/2001 (LE) LE Mtg. 30.03.2001	LL.B. Degree
		19.      UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL	Item No.24/2006 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		20.     EAST ANGLIA UNIVERSITY	Item No.38/2006 (LE)	LL.B. (Hons.) Degree
		21.      NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY	Item No.108/2007 (LE)	LL.B. (Hons.) Degree
		22.     UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER	Item No.7/2008 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		23.*   BANGOR UNIVERSITY	Item No.21/2008 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		24.*   KINGSTON UNIVERSITY, LONDON	Item No.43/2008 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		25.*    UNIVERSITY OF WOLVERHAMPTON  SCHOOL OF LEGAL STUDIES	Item No.44/2008 (LE)	LL. B. (Hons.) Degree
		26.*   SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD, U. K.	Item No.45/2008 (LE)	LL. B. (Hons.) Degree
		27.*   KENT LAW SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF KENT, CANTERBURY	Item No.46/2008 (LE)	LL. B. (Hons.) Degree
		28.*   SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON	Item No.46/2008 (LE)	LL. B. (Hons.) Degree
		29.*   SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON	Item No.46/2008 (LE)	LL. B. (Hons.) Degree
		30.*   UNIVESITY OF WESTMINISTER	Item No.63/2009 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		31.*    BRUNEL LAW SCHOOL, BRUNEL UNIVERSITY, WEST LONDON	Item No.44/2009 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		32.*   SCHOOL OF LAW, BIRMINGHAM CITY UNIVERSITY	Item No.67/2009 (LE)	LL.B. (Hons.) Degree
		33.*   NORTHUMBRIA UNIVERSITY, NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE	Item No.46/2012 (Cl.) Mtg. dated 31.03.2012	Three year and five year under graduate law courses
		34.*   LANCASHIRE LAW SCHOOL, UNIVESITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE, PRESTON	Item No.46/2012 (Cl.) Mtg. dated 31.03.2012	Three year graduate entry LL.B. (Hons.) Senior Status/LPC and 6 year undergraduate entry B. A. (Hons.) Combined law subject and LL.B. (Hons.) Senior Status/ LPC
		35.*    SCHOOL OF LAW, SWANSEA UNIVERSITY, SWANSEA, U. K.	Item no.71/2012 (Cl.) Mtg. dated 18.05.2012	Law Degree LL.B. (Hons.)
12.	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	1.        CORNELL LAW SCHOOL	16/1988	Doctor of Law Degree (J. D.)
		2.        GEORGE TOWN UNIVERSITY	44/2000	Juries Doctor Degree
		3.        SOUTH WESTERN UNIVERSITY	98/1988	Juries Doctor Degree (J. D.)
		4.        UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN	87/1993	Juries Doctor Degree
		5.        UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS	42/2000	Degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence
		6.        MARSHALL THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY, VIRGINIA, USA	Item No.22/2006 (LE)	Juries Doctor
		7.        SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, NEW YORK, USA	Item No.54/2007 (LE)	Juries Doctor
		8.        WIDENER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, WILMINGTON	Item No.53/2008 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		9.        CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW, CLEVELAND STATE UNIVESITY	Item No.54/2008 (LE)	J. D. Degree
		10.      UNIVESITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL, PHILADELPHIA	Item No.55/2008 (LE)	LL.B. Degree
		11.      UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN	Item No.18/2009 (LE)	J. D. Degree
		12.      UNIVESITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY	Item No.23/2009 (LE)	3 year law degree (Juries Doctor)
		13.      FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK	Item No.32/2009 (LE)	J. D. Degree
		14.      SCHOOL OF LAW, LOYOLA UNIVERSTIY, CHICAGO	Item No.43/2009 (LE)	Degree of Juries Doctor
		15.      SCHOOL OF LAW, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSTIY, CALIFORNIA	Item No.45/2009 (LE)	Juries Doctor Programme
		16.      SCHOOL OF LAW, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK	Item No.46/2009 (LE)	Juries Doctor
13.	Zambia	1.        UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA	46/1980	LL.B. Degree

*****

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