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Showing posts with label civil court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil court. Show all posts

Thursday, August 2, 2018

My Quora Answer to : Can an IA be filed while a court case is under CAV (i.e., judgement reserved)

My Quora Answer to : 

If only absolutely necessary, and is inevitable.
An Interim Application can be filed, when the case is reserved for passing Judgement, provided it is not amounting to abuse of process of the Court, and it is in the interest of justice.
Supreme Court J. P. Sathasivam, Jagdish Singh Khehar, have opined in their judgment in “M/S Bagai Construction Tr.Prop vs M/S Gupta Building Material Store on 22 February, 2013”:
“19. We may add a word of caution. The power under Section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly, the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly, if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs.
12) After change of various provisions by way of amendment in the CPC, it is desirable that the recording of evidence should be continuous and followed by arguments and decision thereon within a reasonable time. This Court has repeatedly held that courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule. If the same is not followed, the purpose of amending several provisions in the Code would get defeated. In fact, applications for adjournments, reopening and recalling are interim measures, could be as far as possible avoided and only in compelling and acceptable reasons, those applications are to be considered. We are satisfied that the plaintiff has filed those two applications before the trial Court in order to overcome the lacunae in the plaint, pleadings and evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiff that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted to it to prove its case. During the entire trial, those documents have remained in exclusive possession of the plaintiff, still plaintiff has not placed those bills on record. It further shows that final arguments were heard on number of times and judgment was reserved and only thereafter, in order to improve its case, the plaintiff came forward with such an application to avoid the final judgment against it. Such course is not permissible even with the aid of Section 151 CPC.[1]
Also, Karnataka HC - J. N Jain, V Sabhahit in “Rabiya Bi Kassim M. vs The Country Wide Consumer ... on 5 April, 2004” reported at ILR 2004 KAR 2215, and 2004 (4) KarLJ 189:
Even if we assume it for the sake of argument without accepting, in view of the amendment in CPC, as we find, the law relating to procedure in suits and civil proceedings are governed by CPC, The CPC has been amended from time to time.
Recently also, in order to cut short the delays at various levels in disposal of civil cases, CPC was amended by the Amendment Act of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002.
In the facts of the given case, sufficient opportunity was given to the plaintiff to complete his evidence, but he has not availed the opportunity at appropriate time and thereafter his evidence was closed. The case was fixed for defendant's evidence and ultimately the case was heard and reserved for judgment on 20.6.2001.
In our view, if the matter is reserved for pronouncement of judgment, such an application is not maintainable as otherwise it will defeat the very object of amendment in speedy disposal of the cases.[2]
It is seen by all, and also observed by the Courts that one of the major causes of delay in decision of suit, is the practice of seeking and granting time, delaying in filing of written statements and objections, filing excessive number of Interim Applications, delaying leading of evidence, and seeking adjournments for frivolous reasons.
The Supreme Court in ARJUN SINGH v. MOHINDRA KUMAR, has held that once the matter has been finally heard and posted for judgment, the Court has only to pronouncement the judgment.
After the deletion of the Clause (4) of Order 18 Rule 2
it clearly shows that it is not the intention of the Legislature to permit filing of the interlocutory application, even after the arguments are heard and the matter is reserved for pronouncement of judgment, and therefore, such interlocutory applications cannot be entertained..[3]
Footnotes

Thursday, June 4, 2015

Misuse of Law by a Educationally well Qualifed to claim Alimony Deprecated!

The Mumbai family court has pulled up a highly qualified woman for seeking maintenance from her estranged husband.

The court, presided over by principal judge Dr Laxmi Rao, said that the woman was trying to take undue advantage of the law and using it as a shield against her husband.
Its six-page order, given out recently, said that women cannot sit idle and expect money from former partners.

The woman in question was highly qualified, had pursued her MBA, and was working with a private firm as a human resource personnel.

 In 2014, she approached the court seeking a permanent monthly alimony of Rs 25,000 and an equivalent amount of maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The woman claimed that she was forced to leave her job.

Her argument was that since she was not working and was dependent on her parents and her brother, she was bound to get maintenance.

Her husband, who was an engineer, earning a monthly salary of Rs 25,000, opposed her claim. He claimed that the woman deserted him in 2012, filed for divorce in 2013 and approached the court for maintenance in 2014.

For two years, she sat idle, despite being highly qualified, and this was not acceptable, he said.

The Court relied on a Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in 2000, which had pulled up a woman, who, in spite of being efficient enough, had sought maintenance.

The Mumbai family court judge said: "According to me, Section 24 has been enacted for the purpose of providing monetary assistance to such spouse who is incapable of supporting himself or herself. If the spouse is well qualified, s/he is not expected to remain idle to squeeze out the other... The law does not expect the increasing number of such idle persons, who, by remaining in the arena of legal battles, try to squeeze out the adversary by implementing the provisions of law suitable to their purpose," the court said.

"A lady who is fighting matrimonial petition filed for divorce cannot be permitted to sit idle and put her burden on the husband for demanding pendentelite alimony from him during the pendency of such petition. Section 24 is not meant for creating an army of such idle persons who would be sitting idle waiting for a 'dole', to be awarded by her husband who has got a grievance against her and who has gone to the court seeking relief against her," concluded the order.

Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-don-t-misuse-law-to-squeeze-out-estranged-huband-court-to-woman-2091027

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

Civil Court's Jurisdiction - Companies Bill, 2009? - Corporate Law Articles - Chartered Accountants India,Taxpayers, CAs India, CA india ,ICAI, Compan

Civil Court's Jurisdiction - Companies Bill, 2009? - Corporate Law Articles - Chartered Accountants India,Taxpayers, CAs India, CA india ,ICAI, Company Secretary ,CS, Cost Accountants, MBA, Finance Professionals

by Durga Rao


We all aware that there is no express provision barring the Civil Courts to entertain certain company disputes under the Companies Act, 1956. We have been seeing the cases where the Civil Court entertains Company disputes if there is no specific remedial measure before the Company Law Board or the Company Court. The issue of Civil Court’s Jurisdiction to entertain certain company matters is also supported by the Constitutional Courts on the ground that there is no specific bar under the existing Companies Act, 1956 barring the Civil Courts in entertaining Company matters and on the ground that the Companies Act, 1956 do no provide all remedial measures to all the shareholders before the Company Law Board or the Company Court.
It is true that adjudicating a company dispute requires specialization and the Civil Court may not effectively adjudicate a Company dispute. We are all aware of the inevitable complications under Company Law. Laudably, an effort has been made to bar the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to entertain company matters in the Companies Bill, 2009 or in the proposed new Companies Act replacing Companies Act, 1956.
Section 391 of the Companies Bill, 2009 dealing with the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction is extracted below:
“391. No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal”.
The object of section 391 in the proposed Companies Act is to exclude the Civil Courts in entertaining company disputes and to avoid the jurisdictional ambiguity. Under the existing Companies Act, 1956, shareholders who are qualified to approach the Company Law Board under section 397/398 may choose to approach the Civil Court rather the Company Law Board.
In CDS Financial Services (Mauritius) Limited Vs. BPL Communications Limited and others, (2004) 121 Comp Cases 375, it was held that “when there is no express provision excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, such exclusion can be implied only in cases where a right itself is created and the machinery of enforcement of such right is also provided by the statute. If the right is traceable to the general law of contracts or it is a common law right, it can be enforced through the Civil Court, even though the forum under the statute also will have jurisdiction to enforce that right. Sections 397, 398 and 408 of the Companies Act, 1956, do not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the company court to grant reliefs against oppression and mismanagement. The scope of these sections is to provide a convenient remedy for minority shareholders under certain conditions and the provisions therein are not intended to exclude all other remedies”.
Now, with the express bar under section 391 of the proposed act, if a remedy is available before the National Company Law Tribunal etc. then, no Civil Court can entertain a suit.
But we need to address an issue as to what is the situation if a particular relief is not available to the shareholders before the National Company Law Tribunal or under the new Companies Act?
Under such circumstances, despite section 391 in the proposed Companies Act, it may be very difficult to bar the Civil Courts in entertaining Company Disputes or it may be difficult to lay down a proposition that no shareholder can approach the Civil Court against the managerial personnel, the management or the Company.
It is true that the Civil Court may not be effective like the proposed National Company Law Tribunal, but, when a remedy is not provided before the Tribunal, the shareholders will obviously be approaching the Civil Courts and it may even be supported by the Constitutional Courts in future.
It is true that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is effectively barred under certain enactments like Securitization Law and it is not usual to see a Civil Court to entertain a dispute under Securitization Act upon which the Debt Recovery Tribunal shall have jurisdiction. It is possible under the Securitization Law in view of the limited scope of the subject matter. Under Securitization Law, it is only about the determination of debt or the legality of the action taken by the Bank under the Act. Only the Bank, the borrowers, the guarantors and in some cases a third party, is interested in a securitization case, but, that is not the case with a Company litigation. The Company Law Board, Company Court or the National Company Law Tribunal as the case may be should consider many issues before passing an order in a Company dispute.
In my opinion, it is very difficult to bar the Civil Court’s jurisdiction as intended with section 391 of the proposed Company’s bill or the new act.
In order to achieve the objective of barring the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction effectively, we need a detailed provision barring the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction and there should be a provision similar to section 151 of C.P.C in the proposed Companies Act giving liberty to the shareholders or the members to approach the Tribunal for the relief which is not specifically provided under the Act. If there is such an arrangement under the proposed Act, the National Company Law Tribunal shall decide the maintainability of the applications or the petitions and can pass appropriate orders.
I am sure that it is very difficult to bar the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction as intended with section 391 of the proposed bill or the proposed new Companies Act. There tend to be lot of litigation on the issue of Civil Court’s Jurisdiction even after the new Companies Act coming into force replacing Companies Act, 1956.

Note:
I have expressed my opinion on the issue and I am aware of the complications in Company Law.

by Durga Rao on CACLub India